Section 1: Voluntarist Citizenship
In certain very sensitive places, where culture, identity, citizenship, and nationhood have collided catastrophically, legislation has boldly gone where only narrative-and attendant sporadic violence-went before. The "Good Friday" Belfast Agreement of 1998 enshrined "DIY citizenship" as a right of people in Northern Ireland. They could choose their national identity. They may "identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenships is accepted by both Governments" (Belfast Agreement, quoted in Kiberd 1999, 441) . As Declan Kiberd (1999) commented, the Good Friday Agreement "offers a version of multiple identities of a kind for which no legal language yet exists," but even so, it "effectively sounds the death-knell for old-style constitutions" (p. 443). It enshrined a voluntarist conception of hybrid or "DIY citizenship" (Hartley 1999, 179-81) , based on cultural identity and choice, not on the relationship of people to territory, or even to a single sovereign nation-state.
During television's first fifty years-the broadcast era when "nation" and "television" were frequently understood to be coterminous-popular domestic audiences went through an almost anthropological process of "transmodern teaching" (Hartley 1999, 38-47) . New notions of citizenship arose during that same period that stressed culture, identity, and voluntary belonging over previous definitions based on rights and obligations to a state (see Holston and Appadurai 1996; Chesterman and Galligan 1997; Davidson 1997, 203-15; Peterson and Sanders 1998; Stokes 1997; Trigger 1998; McKay 1998) . These new mediated forms of citizenship were organized around affinity and choice as well as new understandings of other people's lives (i.e., difference) based on mediated contact.
Mass broadcasting to national audiences remained a dominant mode of television, but it was no longer the only one. TV was moving to postbroadcast forms, from time-shifted video and the generic bundles of cable TV to the customized library system of TiVo or online video streaming. Some TV screens also became interactive computer screens. As this repurposing of the TV platform unfolded, so the "national" aspect of television changed, and "media citizenship" began to migrate to sites based not on national identity but on communities that were more fragmented, more international, more virtual, and more voluntary than heretofore.
Already, "the" audience could be "gathered" to act as a national citizenry only with increasing difficulty. Aspects of civic life formerly strongly associated with "public life," as opposed to commercial enterprise, shifted to commercial or corporate contexts. The practice of democracy was increasingly undertaken by "corporate citizens," from The Body Shop to Benetton, from Tesco to Accenture (with its 2001 slogan of MY-DEMOCRACY.COM), led by broadcast and print media, which were themselves habitually "for profit" and "pro patria" all at once. So, commercial democracy and DIY citizenship began to make their presence felt in contexts in which "public service" and obligation had been a predominant discourse. In this context, familiar aspects of national identity were being tested, perhaps to destruction. What composed a nation, citizenship, broadcasting, or democratic participation was, like Irish citizenship, entering an unsettling period of choice.
A practical issue for Australia at this time, perhaps of more fundamental constitutional importance than the temporarily lost Republican referendum of 1999, was how to accommodate its Indigenous population. On one hand, the question was how to resolve the national status and aspirations of Indigenous people and, on the other, was how to "narrate" Australia as an Indigenous nation.
Both of these questions went well beyond television, but necessarily television and other media were implicated and affected in their turn. Then, precisely because of the challenge of Indigeneity to both nation and narration in a media environment, further pressure was put on television itself, in both content and organization. TV could not survive unchanged at such a time, not least because Indigenous people themselves were prolific media producers (Meadows 2001; Hartley and McKee 2000, 166-203) . Various new technologies provided a platform on which "national identity," both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, was a customized application of media functionality.
This was a long way from the model of television as "national culture," in which everyone in a nation-state was routinely presumed to be watching the same shows, sharing the same values, (and therefore) uniting in the same identity (Anderson 1991) . That broadcast model of television suited the idea (and the period) of "mass" societies, but citizenship had evolved along with postbroadcast models of community. In this transitional phase, broadcasting evolved to postbroadcasting, citizenship evolved from cultural to DIY, and nations evolved from states to states of mind. At such a time, the narration of nation was perhaps as important as any other matter on television.
Sometimes, TV simply related the mundane succession of stories from day to day, which provided the various communities in a national audience with knowledge and "affect" (both positive and negative) about each other, and perhaps then the conditions for what Richard Hoggart once called the "amelioration of manners" (see Hartley 1999, 179-81) .
Occasionally, TV played a more spectacular role. Corroboree 2000 witnessed sympathetic and even carnivalesque attention to various acts of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. There was wide national and international coverage of the series of reconciliation walks over bridges in most state capitals, including one across the Sydney Harbour Bridge that attracted more than 250,000 people. Even more spectacular was the Opening Ceremony of the 2000 Olympic Games. Even if "hard" political outcomes of such events-for example, a treaty-were not immediately discernible, nevertheless a crucial visualization and euphoricization of Australia as a multinational (i.e., Aboriginal and settler) state were successfully established.
Aboriginality was dramatized in both the banal and the ceremonial modes of public narration and then-as famously identified by nineteenthcentury British constitutionalist Walter Bagehot-in both the "efficient" and the "dignified" components of the constitution.
Perhaps the emblematic moment of the Olympics Opening Ceremony was when "efficient" thirteen-year-old Nikki Webster-embodiment of the young (white) nation of Australia, of what might be called, if I may, "juvenated paedocratic democratainment" and DIY citizenship incarnate (see Hartley 1999 for most of these barbarisms)-held hands with "dignified" Djakapurra Munyarryan of the Bangarra Dance Theatre, representing Aboriginal Australia. They "bridged" authenticist identity and voluntarist citizenship in an act of cordialized nation building in front of a TV audience estimated by the live TV commentators at 3.7 billion worldwide, more than half of the people then alive, including an actual majority of the Australian population (itself an amazing feat). In fact, so decisive was this moment that The Australian managed to photograph it before it had happenedtheir "Opening Ceremony Souvenir" was printed using dress rehearsal shots (see Figure 1) .
When Aboriginal athlete Cathy Freeman won Australian television's highest ever rating for a fifteen-minute segment, and incidentally the 400 meters at the Olympics, a new form of "political" achievement was finally complete. This moment was in fact the culmination of a public narrative that had been building throughout the 1990s-the story of the "Indigenous public sphere." Instead of politics, here was sport; instead of politicians, here was Cathy Freeman; instead of sovereignty, here was a flag (see Hartley and McKee 2000, chap. 7-9) . Such symbolic and entertainmentbased markers of identity constituted an important currency in popular politics. And the Aboriginalization of the "efficient" sphere itself was canvassed in media speculation about Freeman pursuing an elective career after the Olympics, with the Australian Labor Party at the front of the queue to welcome her aboard. In the meantime, however, she chose "celebrity" rather than "power," by signing up with an international high-status agency, the IMG Management Group.
It could properly be argued that the "efficient" part of politics was slow to put practical effect to these "dignified" visions of an Aboriginal nation (or national identity) within the Australian state. And it might have been noticed that cutesy Nikki Webster gained more media attention in the months following the Opening Ceremony than did the impressively talented, operatic-voiced Djakapurra Munyarryan. Business as usual no doubt reasserted itself in the practical outcomes of "efficiency" as opposed to "dignity."
But it should nevertheless be recognized that putting even symbolic Indigenous nationhood "above" politics, and recognizing the multiple citizenship of Indigenous people in Australia as an accomplished historical fact, was constitutionally novel. An agenda for long-term reorientation of Indigenous politics was set. By 2001, the peak Indigenous body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC, a devolved arm of government with a governance structure directly elected by Indigenous people), was calling for a change. Its elected chair, Geoff Clarke, called for a shift from Native Title claims (which he saw as bogged down in legal process and which had served in many instances not to empower but to distract Aboriginal self-determination) to a national treaty (Australian, March 8, 2001 ). In the meantime, ATSIC also put its weight behind a campaign to launch a new National Indigenous Broadcasting Service in both TV and radio-intended to complement the existing "national broadcasters" of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (a publicly funded corporation on the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] ) and the Special Broadcasting Service (a multilingual, multicultural national TV and radio service, funded by a mixture of advertising revenue and government funding).
Section 2: An Indigenous Public Sphere
In this volatile symbolic context, the concept of the "Indigenous public sphere" described the highly mediated public "space" for evolving notions of Indigeneity. It was the forum for putting them to work in organizing and governing the unpredictable immediacy of everyday events. The Indigenous public sphere was hardly under the control of Indigenous people. Indeed, it was a peculiar example of a public sphere, since it preceded any "nation" that a public sphere normally "expressed," as it were. It was the "civil society" of a nation without formal borders, state institutions, or citizens.
Indigenous people were represented to their non-Indigenous cocitizens via media-possibly more often than in live, casual social contact "at the supermarket checkout" (Langton 1993 ). This communicative association, largely unsupported by face-to-face contact, gave rise to a simultaneous overvaluation and undervaluation of Indigenous people's claims on citizenship as compared with other Australians. The forum for such evaluation was media comment and debate. To some, their conditions appeared "fourth world" and radically below the standards of civic, political, welfare, and human rights enjoyed by other citizens. To others, their claims to rights (notably land rights) based on ethnicity, culture, identity, or unredressed deprivations seemed to be a "privilege" not enjoyed by other citizens and, therefore, an example of inequality of citizenship with the advantage going to Indigenous people (see Mickler 1998) . Both of these positions were symptoms of the structural anomalousness of Indigenous citizenship, which could be summed up very simply-they were citizens without a nation.
Because of the coevolution of citizenship and media, this issue was of central concern to media studies. The unresolved national status of Indigenous people was of course a product of territorial, ethnic, political, and colonial history. But the outcome was a major fault line or fracture for the contemporary Australian body politic. As such, it came increasingly to preoccupy the media, both serious journalism of record and demotic expressions of emotional affinity. Indigeneity became the site around which Australian national identity in general was narrated, disputed, and thought through, in a large-scale colloquy that was several decades in the making.
This public colloquy unfolded in media that were themselves right at the center of developments in notions of citizenship that stressed culture, identity, affinity, and choice, that gathered disparate populations in virtual or imagined "communities" where difference could be celebrated rather than eradicated. Thus, many non-Aboriginal people could begin to see their own issues refracted in Indigenous ones that they encountered through television and media coverage on a daily basis.
Meanwhile, the same media that worried and tugged at the unresolved national status of Indigenous people were also, for Indigenous people themselves, the means by which they developed their own internal (but public) colloquy-the media were the public sphere for the Indigenous "nation" itself. Mainstream media produced by non-Indigenous people, Indigenous people working in the mainstream media, and specialist Indigenous media all played a part in producing and circulating a "national narrative" for Indigenous people, even as they were simultaneously thinking through issues of national identity for non-Indigenous people.
So, there was a peculiar sort of marbling effect in the media narration of nation. Black and white were not mixed but intermingled, circulating around each other, resulting in patterns that were explicable only by reference to the other component. An Indigenous "nation" was discernible in but not of an Australian identity. An Australian nation was at odds with Indigeneity but also obsessed by it. Dialogue was disproportionately intense. Here, in media, was where the nineteenth-century concept of the nation-state was being tested to destruction, where nation was becoming detached from state.
Historically, European narratives gave agency to Europeans, construing "natives" as passive recipients of good actions (development) and bad ones (extermination or coercive control) but only rarely and grudgingly giving agency and a "speaking part" to the "other" of their imaginings (see Miller 1995) . This certainly described the history of Indigeneity in Australia, but here too change was rapidly occurring. Indeed, the "Indigenous public sphere" was evidence that Australia was indigenizing its narrative sense of self as a whole.
Thus, the period could be characterized as an intense dialogue between "Aboriginal" and "Australian" components of the overall Australian "semiosphere," the outcome of which was not yet resolved. Would there develop an autonomous Indigenous "nation" within an Australian state? Or would Australia indigenize its own history, politics, and community identity? There was some evidence that both of those possibilities were occurring at once. Certainly, imaginative space was made for them in media stories and visualizations. But of course, it was not inevitable that either of them must eventuate.
Section 3: Nation and State, Not Race Why was Indigeneity understood as a matter of race? It looked to some observers very much like a matter of nation (Reynolds 1996) . Why was Australia-and not only by a provocative political party of that nameseen as "one nation"? It looked very much like one state (Chua 2000) . Why were some "Australians" not understood as "ethnic"? Australia contained people from more nationalities than you could poke a stick at, but it "ethnicized" some immigrants and Indigenous people while instating its "British" or "Anglo-Celtic" component as a kind of ex-nominated established race (see Griffiths 1996, 229-30) .
The Australian nation was habitually conflated with the state, allowing no space for several nations in one state. The solution that had more or less worked in Singapore for so long-to "ethnicize" everyone in a racially neutral state, including the majority Chinese-was difficult for Australia. In Singapore, as Chua Beng Huat pointed out, English was the native tongue of none of the three recognized racial groups (Chinese, Malay, and Indian), all of whom were therefore equal in having to learn it to conduct both business and the business of government:
In the Australian and Canadian case, the Anglo groups cannot be ethnicised. Whereas in the case of Singapore, the demographically dominant Chinese group is in fact ethnicised by the state-it is just another racial group. That is to say, the interests of the state are not captured by the interest of the dominant Chinese majority. . . . If [Singapore] had adopted Mandarin as the national language, it would have been a whole different politics. But, by insisting on the neutral English language it allowed the ethnicisation of the majority, and therefore separated state interests . . . from Chinese interests. (Chua 2000) For a long period, the White Australia policy supported a conflation of state, race, and national identity, and some conservative populists remained politically active on that ground long afterwards. Despite real and popular concessions to its multicultural and Indigenous components since 1967, a powerful strand of thought continued to insist on ethnic cultural content as part of Australian identity. And because there was no unitary Aboriginal nation before 1788-there were several hundred different language communities-there was skepticism even among Aboriginal people themselves about political organization at the national level. Advances in recognizing Native Title did not help in this respect. They tended not to nationalize but to "Balkanize" Indigenous polities around "clans" (for an interesting media effect of which, see The Weekend Australian, November 25-26, 2000, front page lead: "Murder, Sorcery and Tribal Law Spill Bad Blood between Native Leaders"). An Indigenous public sphere required a level of "national" organization of the Indigenous "polity" that had no precedent in Aboriginal and Islander history. Without a nation, without a state, Aboriginal people were hemmed ever further in by "race."
The recognition that there was a difference between nation, ethnicity, and state was an international development, at different stages of contestation and resolution around the world, from Palestine to Fiji, Sri Lanka to Canada.
In the United Kingdom, even the English had begun to discover that they were ethnic, compared not only to immigrants and their descendants but also to the "Indigenous" (Celtic) "home nations" of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, not to mention Cornwall. To the dismay of political and cultural elites, the most visible form taken by popular English ethnicization was chauvinism and football hooliganism. But increasingly there were calls for an English parliament. The Belfast Agreement-subversive of "old-style constitutions" on both sides of the Irish Sea-offered that vision back to the English. A paragraph discussed "devolved institutions" in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, "and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United Kingdom" (quoted in Kiberd 1999, 442)-which must have referred to the possibility of a decolonization of the English nation from "British" state arrangements (Nairn 1997 (Nairn , 2000 .
Meanwhile, English ethnicity became defensible at law, interestingly in the very field of broadcasting and national identity. In August 2001, a veteran radio broadcaster won a case against BBC Wales for wrongful dismissal. The man was (and sounded) English, and his long-running show was dropped in favor of "a strong Welsh voice." Despite the BBC's protestations that the show in question was "tired and out of touch" and that they had wanted to "reverse declining audience figures and broaden the station's appeal to the whole of Wales," the tribunal found that racial discrimination against the Englishman had occurred (see BBC 2001) .
In Germany, a continuing debate about deutschten Leitkultur (German "lead culture") suggested that many in that country were not yet prepared to separate citizenship from ethno-territorial heritage. Certainly, Germany retained strong ethno-cultural content in its citizenship rules, even when this may have had negative economic effects. For instance, a scheme to attract information technology specialists to Germany from India failed in 2001, not least because of language and culture requirements on immigrants that were not needed in the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom. In this context, despite its English-language environment and multicultural commitments, Australian immigration rules still leaned toward the German model. Immigrants were under formal and informal pressure to "identify" with received Australian ethno-cultural content.
Developments in Indigenous nationalism were equally international. Indigenous leaderships in many countries, from Siberia and Scandinavia to North America and New Zealand, shared the same problems both internally, in the extent to which they could speak on behalf of "their whole people," and externally, in the degree and direction of activism needed to defend, survive, and adapt (see Jull 1994) . "Ethno-nationalism" itself was fraught with dangers for Indigenous peoples and others, as events attested in Chechnya, former Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, it was precisely out of such hot spots where cultures collided that new notions of "the" nation, and new ways of accommodating difference within citizenship, could emerge.
Writing of Indigenous people in Siberia, Marjorie Balzer identified what she called a "form of nonchauvinist ethnonationalism, a politicized yet usually liberal ethnic consciousness born of the need to defend their cultural heritage and lands" (Balzer 1999, 221) . Many Native American leaders also rejected full assimilation, she wrote, "while accommodating themselves to living with dignity in the Anglo world. On both sides of the Bering Sea, multiple identities on multiple levels, activated situationally with flexible style, have become normal for Indigenous leaders, if not for all their peoples" (Balzer 1999, 220) . She concluded that "Native consensus-style democracy (not necessarily United States majority-rule democracy) may be a means toward ensuring more liberal varieties of ethnonationalism" (Balzer 1999, 223) .
Nonchauvinist ethno-nationalism, multiple identities, voluntarist citizenship-plus land and good lawyers-were part of a groundswell for a shift toward "multinational" states. How did people on both sides "accommodate to living with dignity in each other's world"? Contact and dialogue were essential, both personal and at the mediated national level. National and international media were central to the process.
Section 4: "Two Domains"
Turning to the history of national narrative, the "narrative accrual" that Bain Attwood (1996) identified as Australian nationhood, it was clear that Indigeneity was among other things a story-one historically about rather than by Indigenous people. In fact, the research done by McKee and me suggested that two distinct types of story were found across the range of academic, government, and media stories about Indigenous issues in the period up to the late 1990s.
Here again, an innovation in method in media studies could be claimed. Instead of identifying the "coverage" of Aboriginal issues in the media narrowly, we used a wide definition of media, to include newspapers, television, radio, magazines, and academic or policy reports, as well as a wide range of media forms and genres, from news and talkback to sport, lifestyle shows, and drama. The "reporting" of Indigenous affairs could not be understood without situating news media in that larger structure-"news" was a form of storytelling that performed certain narrative functions that were only comprehensible when contrasted with others. The "universe of Indigeneity" was a dialogue between differing domains within an overall "semiosphere," linking rather than separating academic, administrative, media, and political narratives of Indigeneity. We took the terms law formation and anomaly (not to mention semiosphere) from Yuri Lotman (1990, 151-53) . He distinguished between two types of structure within the semiosphere (see Figure 2 ).
Lotman's typology of texts brought together the kinds of story that were usually so strictly separated from each other that they seemed unconnected: scientific inquiry and news, or traditional myths and contemporary soap opera, or fact and fiction, right down to micro-distinctions such as those that operated within a given form, such as "hard" and "soft" news, news journalism and feature journalism, the daily press and the magazine press, print journalism and broadcast journalism. These were strongly felt distinctions that could sustain entire industry sectors. But the stories produced within each specialism shared important characteristics with those from elsewhere and could only be properly understood in a larger typology of contrasting story types.
The maintenance of the distinction between different forms could prove more important than individual stories. Truth-seeking stories were produced by such great overarching cultural institutions as "science," "education," and "government" and were kept radically apart from stories produced by "the media," especially those parts of the media that seemed to deal only in ephemera and entertainment. But the very efforts made to keep different story types separate were evidence that the different categories, organizations, and institutions were parts of a larger, common structure.
Discourses of action needed to be contrasted with discourses of orderneither could be understood without the contrasting copresence of the other. News vied with myth. In Lotman's typology, myth shared the same aims as science-reducing the world to order to understand it-and used the same techniques as soap opera. Meanwhile, news was a species of history, using the same techniques as the action hero plot. Narratives from apparently dissimilar contexts, such as academic research, media information, and media entertainment, occupied the same category in the overall scheme of things in the "mediasphere."
Analyzing academic and media "inventions" of Indigeneity over the past decade, McKee and I identified "two domains" in an overall "universe of Indigeneity":
• Indigeneity of law formation-a sphere of anthropology and administration, exemplified by the work of Fred Myers ([1986] 1991) and Tim Rowse (1992 Rowse ( , 1993 . It was centered on land and interested in traditional forms of life, land rights, remote communities, and the ATSIC. It was dedicated to the reproduction of orderliness and was conducted by academic discourses and discourses of governance. Its characteristic narrational form was myth.
• Indigeneity of anomaly-a sphere of correction and protection, exemplified by the work of the Stolen Generations report (National Inquiry 1997) and the work of Quentin Beresford and Paul Omaji (1996) . It was centered on persons, Lotman (1990, 151-53) .
LAW-FORMING TEXTS ANOMALOUS TEXTS Fixed in space
Mobile-"able to cross the structured boundaries of cultural space"
No new information (repetitious) One-off occurrences (anomalies)
Narrative determined by Narrative determined by succession of nature (season, cosmos, land); deeds (plot) story can begin at any point located in urban and suburban life, and interested in the impact of the welfare and justice systems, in carers or fiduciaries of Aboriginal populations, and in Aboriginal people living a nontraditional life. It was dedicated to action discourses. Its characteristic media form was news (see Figure 3 ).
On one hand was law formation-fixed in space; where central narratives were concerned with identity, nature, reducing the world to order; and where stories were about the "we" community, recording principles. On the other hand was found mobility-infringement of boundaries; narratives about action, the world, difference, and anomalous occurrences; and where stories were about "they" identities, recording not principles but violations, crimes and events. In short: myth and news.
But these opposing text-generating mechanisms were not capable of independent existence on their own. As Lotman said, each needed the other to exist at all. It was important to notice the implication, that the "anomalous" domain-which appears to be the one and only Aboriginal domain in much news coverage of Indigenous issues (because of the type and function of news)-was merely one side of the narrative coin, needing to be understood in relation to law-forming narratives that exist elsewhere in the mediasphere. In other words, news was only the half of it. It was systematically the half.
Section 5: "Narrative Accrual"
Bain Attwood (1996) discussed how a nation was constituted and became aware of itself through a process of what he called "narrative accrual":
A process whereby a corpus of connected and shared narratives constitute something which can be called either a myth, a history, or a tradition. Furthermore, it was only as the people came to comprehend and know this story that they came to realise and be conscious of themselves as Australians. (p. 101)
The implication of Attwood's schema was that the "universe of Indigeneity" was itself part of the process of "narrative accrual" that constituted Australia. Together, the "anthropological/administrative" domain of "law formation" and the "anomalous" domain of "correction and protection" made up an "Aboriginal" component of that narrative accrual. This component occurred within a larger semiosphere, along with "British" and "Australian" components, each with its own history and a mutual history of interactions, dialogue and silence, more or less intense in different periods, in which Australia as a whole "accrued" narratively (see Figure 4) .
With the amendment of (British) common law by the Mabo and Wik decisions on Native Title in the early 1990s, Australia turned out to "mean" something quite new. Its origin, terra nullius, was overturned. Its future turned on the outcome of new dialogue with Indigenous people. Aboriginal and Islander people were "discovered" by history to be separate from the Australian nation, resulting in "three nations encased within the Australian state" (Reynolds 1996, 177) . They became more important than the "British" component of Australia. This, however, like the Irish Republican Army (in Gerry Adams's famous phrase) did not "go away"-as witness the referendum in November 1999, when a particular model of an Australian republic was rejected, with the result that the British Crown remained the Australian head of state.
These changes occurred within an explosion of discourse right across the media (both factual and fictional), government, and the academy. The 1990s in Australia were characterized by unusually intense internal dialogue about what was at stake in the meaning of the new relationships, from Mabo to One Nation to the referendum. In 2000, the trend continued with Aboriginal Reconciliation and the Olympics.
The whole structure would have been neat and tidy if it was not for Aboriginal people's own politics, on one hand, and the crisis of legitimacy precipitated by Mabo and Wik (i.e., literally "rewriting Australian history"), on the other. The orderly generation of stories in government reports and the news media about Aboriginal life and crime was radically disrupted in the 1990s. To understand media coverage of Indigenous issues during this period, then, it was necessary to
• contrast the two different "Aboriginal domains" with each other, • contrast the "universe of Indigeneity" thus constituted with "Australian"
and "British" components of the Australian national narrative over time, and
• understand how Indigenous appropriations of the domains, of their components of the stories, and of the media themselves were producing new patterns and relationships in the Australian semiosphere.
Hartley / Television, Nation, and Indigenous Media 21 the relationship between Dingo and Blanchett established a principle, reducing the world to a new orderliness, in which the universe of Indigeneity joined with the Australian component of the Australian semiosphere. The kiss was a promise.
Heartland made its promises in dramatic, fictional mode. Time was required to determine whether the worlds of politics and news would live up to that promise. The election of a conservative federal government in 1996, the rise and fall of the One Nation anti-Aboriginal party, and the intense media coverage of Native Title and land rights may have suggested that this was a kiss that died on the lips. But the very intensity of the debate, the vicissitudes of a relationship between parties who felt mutually unintelligible, bespoke a "mutual attraction" between the Aboriginal and Australian components of the Australian semiosphere that was evidence not of a one-night stand but of a dialogue leading to a long-term affair. The terms of engagement in which that dialogue was conducted were not confined to traditional "public affairs." The personal, sexual, and private were also key components of the Indigenous public sphere, as the "stolen generations" saga made all too clear (see National Inquiry 1997).
Heartland was classic broadcast television-a drama miniseries put out by the "national broadcaster." The end of Australia "as we knew it" was presaged in this fairy-tale marriage of the prince and princess from different mediated nations. Reality began to catch up a bit afterwards, with, for instance, the reconciliation bridge crossings around Australia, the "sorry" movement, and some real attempts at political cordialization on all sides, not just at the Olympics. Still, the national status of Indigenous people remained unresolved, but at least the direction became clearer.
And what of "television" as we knew it? As technologies converged, as cultural content became a service industry, the greatest product of broadcast media-the mass, national audience of citizen-readers-could not survive intact. Instead, internally differentiated, customized, interactive, and individuated audience segments would make their own choices, would increasingly act as producers as well as consumers of mediated meanings, and would identify less with nation-states and more with constituencies of taste and affiliation that were local and international at once. The Indigenous media sector blazed the trail. It was within that context that analysts and activists alike had to look for the next episodes in both the narrative accrual of Australia and the historical evolution of television.
